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THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES OF EXPRESS CARRIERS.
1. This article contains an epitome of the law in regard to express carriers.
2. Carriers by express responsible as common carriers.
3. And, in addition, the owners of goods have the responsibility of the carriers
employed by such express company.
4. The same rule established in an early American case. Statement of facts.'
5. Statement of the points decided. Responsibility of general carriers.
6. Contracts exonerating carrier for neglect against sound policy. Course of
decisions, in America, upon analogous questions.
7. Finally settled, that carriers may contract for exemption from that extraordi.
nary responsibility imposed by common law.
8. It was next attempted to allow them to contract for exemption from all
responsibility. English statute. American rule much the same.
9. It is upon this ground that carriers are held responsible for parcels carried by
their servants, in the due course of their business.
10. The distinctive character of express carriers is, that they make personal
delivery to the consignees upon their route.
11. Stipulations in the bills of lading executed by express companies, how far
binding upon the owners of goods.
12. There should be the clearest evidence of free assent, or the conditions excus-
ing the carrier from responsibility should not be held binding.
13. How far the consignor, or his agent, may stipulate.for the transportation.
14. By the construction of the English statute against carriers making discrim-
ination among their customers, it is held they cannot receive parcels of express
companies and close their offices against others.
15. Illustration, from an English cse, as to what degree of evidence will charge
the owner of goods with knowledge of conditions inserted in the bill of lading.
16. The English rule as to responsibility of different carriers constituting a con-
tinuous line. The first carrier alone responsible to the owner.
17. The American rule allows the owner to sue any of the companies in fault.
18. Where there is no contract and no business connection extending to the
entire route, the first carrier is only responsible for his own line.
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19. Express carriers held responsible for safe transportation over their own line,
and safe delivery to next carrier.
20. Analysis of more recent decisions and new questions affecting express
carriers.
(1). Dangerous character of goods must be communicated to carrier.
(2). Held, in New Jersey, that carrier cannot stipulate for exemption from
responsibility, for his own negligence.
(3). The first carrier, as to the transportation beyond his own route, is respon-
sible only as a forwarder, for ordinary care and diligence. Lien.
(4). General duty of carriers. English statute. Duty as to delivery.
(5). Express companies should deliver at place of business of consignee, within
business hours, and as soon as possible after arrival.
(6). If they undertake, for hire, the collection of bills and notes, they are
responsible for all defaults in the course pursued, caused by their own neglect or
mistake.
(7). Railways, in drawing cars over their road, responsible as carriers.
(8). The form of action, and the extent of the recovery.
(9). The damages recoverable of the carrier for loss or injury of the goods is
limited to that affecting the goods ; expected profits not included.
(10). The carrier is entitled to a receipt for goods, as delivered in good con-
dition, and the owner, to time and opportunity to examine.
1. In attempting to give an outline of the responsibilities and
duties of what are known familiarly, in this country, as express
carriers, but more commonly called, in England, carriers of packed
parcels, we shall be able to do little more than to epitomize what
we have said in our book upon Railways, with the addition of such
cases as have been decided since the last edition of that work was
published.
2. There was, for a time, some question made in the courts
how far these express carriers were to be subjected to the respon-
sibilities of common carriers of goods and merchandise. But it
seems to be now conceded, on all hands, that the express carrier
is clearly responsible to those interested in any goods committed
to his care for transportation, to the full extent of the responsi-
bility of common carriers of goods. This has been so often
declared by different courts of the highest authority, that there
seems now no ground to question its entire soundness; and it will
scarcely be useful to repeat here the numerous decisions upon the
point. The following will show sufficiently the general current
of the cases in this country, in all which it is held that express
companies are responsible as common carriers: Te Mercantile
Mutual Insurance Company v. Chase, 1 E. D. Smith 115; Sher-
man v. Welles, 28 Barb. 403 ; Baldwin v. The American .x-
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press Company, 23 Illinois Rep. 197; s. c. in error, 26 Illinois
504; Lowell Wire-Fence Company v. Sargent, 8 Allen 189.
3. In England, and upon the continent of Europe, so far as we
know, the railway companies act, to a considerable extent, as the
carriers of parcels of all sizes and kinds, although, as before
stated, they also carry packed parcels, addressed to different con-
signees, and in the charge of some general, or special, agent acting
on behalf of the consignees. In all such cases, wh-bther such
packed parcels are in charge of a general express agent, who
makes that his constant employment, between certain points, and
who would thereby himself incur also the responsibilities of a
common carrier, or of a special agent of the consignees, acting
upon a single occasion, and who would thereby himself incur only
the responsibility of an ordinary agent, in both cases, the owners
have a right to resort to the responsibility of the company con-
veying the packages, and to hold them responsible to the full
extent of common carriers generally, unless there is some stipu-
lation between the company, and the agents from whom they
received the goods, that they shall incur a less degree of respon-
sibility: Redfield on Railways, § 126, pl. 6, p. 239; Baxendale
v. Western Railway Company, 5 C. B. N. S. 386; Garton v.
Bristol & Exeter Railway Company, 7 Jur. N. S. 1234; Branly
v. South Eastern Bailway Company, 9 Jur. N. S. 329.
4. The same rule was established in this country, as it were,
in the very infancy of transportation by express companies, in a
case where the property was of considerable value ($18,000), and
where the subject was considered and discussed, in all its bearings,
by the Supreme Court of the United States: New Jersey Steam
Navigation Company v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344. The
leading opinion of the court was here delivered by Mr. Justice
NELSON, and concurred in by Chief Justice TANEY and Justices
MCLEAN and WAYNE. Some of the other judges concurred in
the result, but upon other grounds, and others dissented, but
chiefly upon the ground of want of jurisdiction in the court, the
suit being instituted in admiralty. This case must be considered
as the leading American case, in regard to the duties of railways
and steamboats, in the transportation of express packages, while
in charge of the express agent.
The package, in question in this case, had been intrusted by
the plaintiffs below to William F. Harnden, a resident of Boston,
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and the originator, probably, of this mode of transportation upon
railways and steamboats, who was, at the time, engaged in car-
rying " small packages of goods, specie, and bundles of all kinds,
daily, for any persons choosing to employ him, to and from the
cities of Boston and New York, using the public conveyances
between those cities as the mode of transportation." He had
entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs in error, the defend
ants below, by which, for $250 per month, he was allowed to
transport, upon their steamers, his crate of parcels, "1 contents
unknown ;" the crate and its contents to be at all times at Harn-
den's risk, and the company "not, in any event, to be respon-
sible, either to him or his employers, for the loss of any goods or
other things transported under the contract." Public notice was
required to be given by Harnden to this effect, and he was also
required to insert this condition, exempting the steamboat com-
pany from responsibility, in the receipt which he gave for goods
transported by him, upon their boats. This condition was in the
following terms: "1 Take notice. William F. Harnden is alone
responsible for the loss or injury of any articles or property com-
mitted to his care; nor is any risk assumed by, nor can any be
attached to, the proprietors of the steamboats in which his crate
may be and is transported, in respect to it, or its contents, at any
time." The $18,000 was specie which the plaintiffs had employed
Harnden to collect for them in the city of New York.
5. The points decided in this case are thus stated: The general
owner of specie who has employed an expressman to transport it
for him, may maintain an action against the carriers employed by
such expressman, and who are the proprietors of a steamboat upon
which the same is transported, for its loss, through the fault of
such proprietors, or their agents. But in such cases, the rights
of the general owner are controlled by a valid contract between
the expressman and the carriers employed by him. A stipulation,
however, in such contract that the carriers are not to be respon-
sible in any event for loss or damage, cannot be construed to
exonerate them for losses caused by their own want of ordinary
care. We are not aware that these propositions have been seri-
ously questioned, or essentially qualified in the subsequent cases.
6. How far an express stipulation, on the part of the owner
of goods committed to carriers for transportation, that the carrier
shall be exonerated from all responsibility, even for the gross
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neglect of himself and his servants, can be regarded as a binding
contract, and consistent with sound policy, is a question of too
great extension and importance to be discussed here, as incidental
to our main purpose. It is safe to assume, as the courts univer-
sally do, that no such result will be allowed to come about by any-
thing less than the use of the most unequivocal language to that
effect. All intendments and constructive inferences will be car-
ried in the opposite direction. And when it becomes impossible
to understand the contract between the carrier and the owner of
the goods, in any other sense except that of exonerating the
former for gross neglect, or even ordinary neglect, we trust the
courts will maintain sufficient self-respect to declar6 the contract
void: Redfield on Railways, § 134, pp. 281, 282. It seems to
involve a very curious anomaly, in the history of the progress of
jurisprudence, that when a point, strenuously contested,.for years,
is once finally conceded, it will generally give rise to serious
efforts to carry the matter, quite into the extreme of the reductio ad
absurdum, in the opposite direction. This is very well illustrated,
upon the point we are now considering, by briefly adverting to
the course of the decisions upon the question, whether it was com-
petent for common carriers, by express contract or general notice,
to exonerate themselves from that extraordinary responsibility
imposed upon them by the common law, whereby they are made
insurers for the safe delivery of all goods committed to their cus-
tody. It was for a long period seriously and strenuously urged,
by the courts, and by some text-writers perhaps, that such relaxa-
tion was wholly inadmissible. That was so held in Gould v. Hill,
2 Hill 623; Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234; Cole v. Good-
win, Id. 251; and these cases are quoted, with approbation, by
Mr. Justice NELSON, in N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. 11ferehants'
Bank supra.
T. But it was finally found, upon more careful scrutiny, that
there was no objection, in principle, to allowing the parties
to contract, if 'done freely and upon reasonable conditions of
equality, for any degree of relaxation of the extraordinary degree
of vigilance and responsibility imposed upon carriers by the com-
mon law, provided the relaxation were not carried into the domain
of negligence and inattention to duty. See Farmers' and Me.
chanics' Bank v. Champlain Transportation Cofnpany, 23 Vt.
Rep. 186, 205, 206, where we have discussed the point more in
detail.
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8. After this point was universally yielded, if we except the
state of New York, and some few others following their lead, it
was next attempted to carry the right of exemption from respon-
sibility, on the part of common carriers, by means of special con
tracts, still further, and virtually to allow them to make their own
terms, both as to price and the degree of responsibility assumed
in regard to the risk of transportation. The English statute,
entitled The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Viet.
c. 31, s. 7, was passed in consequence, and has placed the subject
upon more reasonable and practicable grounds, in that country.
This act allows the carrier to make any condition in regard to the
terms of transportation, such as giving notice of the contents of
packages, and paying insurance in advance; in short, upon any
point, and to any extent, which the court before whom any action
may be brought shall adjudge to be just and reasonable, provided
that such conditions shall not be binding unless incorporated into
a special contract signed by the person owning or delivering the
goods. The English statute also provides, that no stipulation
exonerating the carrier from responsibility for losses or injuries,
caused by the neglect or want of ordinary care of the carrier or
his servants, shall be binding upon the owner of the goods. As
to the reasonableness of the conditions to be imposed by carriers,
the American courts had anticipated the English statute: Farmers'
and Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transportation Co., 23 Vt.
186.
9. The rule established by the case of N. T1. Steam Navigation
Co. v. M3erchants' Bank, supra, in regard to the responsibility
of the company to the owner, for the safe transportation and deli-
very of parcels intrusted to expressmen employing such com-
pany, is not very different from that which had before existed,in
regard to parcels carried upon stages and steamboats, by the
drivers and captains, in some instances without the actual know-
ledge and consent perhaps, of the owners of such agencies of
transportation; and in other cases, when such agents or servants
were allowed to carry such parcels, without accounting for the
compensation, that being treated as a mere perquisite of office.'
In all such cases the owners of the conveyances always have been
held responsible, as common carriers, for the transportation of such
parcels: Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Chiamplain Trans-
portation Co., 23 Vt. Rep. 186, 203,204, and cases cited. Before
the establishment of express companies this was the usual, and
EESPONSrBILITIES, &c., OF EXPRESS CARRIERS.
only public mode, of transporting small parcels: i'agall v. Bos
ton and Maine Railroad Company, 19 N. H. Rep. 122.
10. In turning our attention more specifically to the responsi
bility of express carriers, the first consideration distinctive of this
mode of transportation is, that they are bound to deliver parcels
to the persons to whom they are addressed. This was the gene-
ral rule as to carriers by land, until since the introduction of rail-
ways: HZyde v. Trent and MDersey Nay. Company, 5 T. R. 389;
Stephenson v. Hart, 4 Bing. 476; Farmers' and Mlfeclanics' Bank
v. Champlain Transp. Co., 23 Vt. Rep. 186. Since the intro-
duction of railways carriers in that mode have been exempted
from personal delivery of their parcels, and allowed to deposit
them in warehouse, and thus exonerate themselves from the longer
continuance of the responsibility of carriers: Tlwrnas v. The
Boston and Prov. .1ailroad Company, 10 Met. 472. But the great
necessity for having express carriers arose from this defect in deli-
very of goods by the ordinary railway transportation; and the same
defect also existed in regard to the delivery of goods transported by
steamboats. They could only deliver at the wharves, and were
not expected to employ special messengers and porters to deliver
their goods: Oickering v. Fowler, 4 Pick. 371. And it is to
remedy this inconvenience, and restore the carrying business by
land to its former state, in some degree, that express companies
have come in use, with the distinctive character of making personal
delivery of'their parcels to the consignees : Redfield on Railways,
§ 127. This has been so often decided that it is scarcely required
that any considerable number of cases should be cited. This
question is considerably examined, and the views just stated fully
confirmed, in the case of Baldwin v. The American _Express Co.,
23 Illinois 197; S. c. affirmed, 26 Id. 504.
11. Perhaps the most important practical question, in regard
to the responsibility of express carriers, arises upon stipulations
made -with them or claimed to be made -with them, in regard to
the extent of their responsibility for the transportation. It has
become very common with such companies to insert in the bills
of lading or receipts, which they deliver to those who leave parcels
with them for transportation, such conditions as exonerate them
from all extraordinary responsibility. We have no occasion to
discuss the propriety or good policy of such practices. It seems
to be regarded as competent, and binding upon the owners of the
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goods, if understandingly assented to by them. And this will
generally be presumed where it is not, in some way, written or
printed in such manner, purposely, as not to attract observation.
If that appear to have been the design of the carrier, it is surely
proper that he should derive no benefit from the condition. Any
such evasion or subterfuge, which is obviously intended to mis-
lead the owner of the goods, by leaving the impression that he
has secured the unqualified responsibility of the carrier, while, at
the same time, the carrier has secured a formal, but covert stipu-
lation on his part, for exemption from that responsibility, should
certainly be discountenanced.
12. And it has always seemed to us the courts will find it con-
venient, if noL iudispensable, to restrain these express companies,
to some extent, in regard to the limitations which they impose
upon their customers. It should certainly appear that no deception
is practised, but that the owner of the goods fully understood the
conditions upon which the carrier claimed to deliver the goods, or
else that he might have done so but for his want of ordinary care ;
and especially will this be 'requisite to be watchfully enforced,
whenever the conditions found in the receipt are of an unusual
and extraordinary character, and such as it is presumable that the
owner of the goods would not readily have submitted to, without
the stress of some extraordinary pressure. In short, unless it
appear that the conditions exonerating the responsibility of the
carrier are reasonable, and such as it may fairly be supposed the
owner of the goods would readily have assented to, nothing but
the clearest, most satisfactory evidence that he did assent to them,
should be received. And in all cases, any condition exonerating
the carrier from his ordinary common law responsibility should
be clearly and plainly expressed in the contract, and in a form
readily to attract the attention of the consignor of the goods.
13. And it may well be made a question, how far the consignor
of goods, by express, and especially the porter, or hackman, or city
express, delivering parcels to the express carrier, have authority to
bind the owner of the goods. The English statute makes the special
contract of the owner or person delivering the goods sufficient in
all cases. And any other rule would be liable to great incon-
venience in practice, since the express carrier may make his own
conditions for accepting goods, at the peril of an action, if the
condition is not acceded to, and proves to be unreasonable, upon
RESPONSIBILITIES, &c., OF EXPRESS CARRIERS.
the trial of the action for not carrying. In other words, express
carriers, in common with all other carriers, are bound to accept and
carry all goods offered, within the range of the business they hold
themselves out to do, if the charges are also tendered ; and they
cannot exonerate themselves from this obligation at common law,
by insisting upon annexing any condition relieving their ordinary
responsibility: Garton v. Bristol and Bxeter Railway Uompany,
1 El. B. & S. 112; s. c. 7 Jur. N. S. 1234. But if they do annex
any such condition, at common law, or what is called under the
English statute, an unreasonable condition, and the same is not
acceded to, they remain liable to such damages as the party has
sustained, by reason of their refusal to carry the goods, or what
is the same thing, to carry them except upon conditions, which
they had no right to claim. But if, instead of refusing to accede
to the conditions claimed by the carrier, and pursuing his remedy
by action, the owner of the goods finds it more convenient to yield
to the demands of the carrier, which he might have resisted, and
stipulates with the carrier, fully and understandingly, for a reduced
degree of responsibility, as a choice of evils, we see no good rea-
son why he should not be bound by his contract, although to
some extent compelled to adopt it, as the lesser of two evils, both
of which he could not escape. And in general it is fair to con-
clude that the consignor of the goods, or any agent to whom he
sees fit to intrust the delivery of the goods, will and must have
authority to bind the owner, in his absence, since some one must
act on his behalf in giving instructions, and making conditions
affecting the transportation; and in the absence of the owner, and
of any known general agent of such owner, it seems almost a
necessity to give the person delivering the goods, or having charge
of the delivery, not the mere porter or servant, but the agent
under whom such servant acts, power to bind the owner. The
recent English case of Bartlett v. -London and NWorth- Western
Railway Co., 7 Hl. & N. 400, s. c. 8 Jur. N. S. 58, seems to assume
the same general view. It was there held that the consignors had
the right, in the first instance, to make a binding contract with the
carrier, as to the mode of delivery ; but that the carrier would be
excused if he modified the performance of the same, according to
the directions of the consignee, thus giving the consignor, whe-
ther owner or not, the right to make a binding contract on the
part of every one interested in the transportation in the frst
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instance, as to every matter pertaining to it, but at the same time,
from like considerations of convenience and necessity, allowing
the consignee to modify such contract as to those matters appa.
rently affecting his agency, whether he were in fact the owner or
not.
14. It was decided in the case of Carton v. Bristol and .Exeter
Railway Company, supra, that a railway company had no right
to close their office and refuse to receive parcels packed in the
same way express agents were accustomed to pack them, while
they were still receiving such parcels from such agents.
15. In a late English case, Lewis v. Great Western -Railway
Gompany, 5 H. & N. 867, upon the point of the agent making
the delivery of goods, being bound by the conditions inserted in
the memorandum made and signed at the time, when under the
head " Conditions" was written: " No claim for deficiency,
damage, or detention will be allowed, unless made within three
days after the delivery of the goods; nor for loss, unless made
within seven days of the time they should have been delivered ;"
and the plaintiff testified "he was told to sign the paper and did so;
he might have seen the word ' Conditions' but did not read them,
and was not told what they were ;" and one of the packages was
not delivered, and was not called for within seven days of the
time it should have been delivered: it was held, there was
nothing to rebut the presumption arising from the signature of the
paper by the plaintiff, that he understood that the contract was
subject to the conditions; and they were considered just and
reasonable within the English statute.
16. It becomes a very important practical question, To what
extent the first express carrier, upon a long line of transportation:
is responsible. We see no reason why the responsibility of this
class of carriers should not be the same, as to long lines of trans-
portation, as that of other carriers. The profession all agree that
there is a distinction in this respect between the rule of responsi-
bility imposed upon carriers in America, on long lines of trans-
portation, and that imposed in England. In the latter country,
by a long and uniform course of decision, based upon the leading
case of Muscl amp v. Lancaster and Preston Railway Company,
8 M. & W. 421, it is clearly established that the carrier, by ac-
cepting a package of goods, marked for any distant point, assumes
the responsibility of its safe arrival and timely delivery at its
RESPONSIBILITIES, &c., OF EXPRESS CARRIERS. 11
ultimate destination. This rule has been carried so far in England
that it has been recently held in the House of Lords, Bristol and
Exeter Railway Company v. Collins, 7 House of Lords Cas.
194, s. c. 5 Jur. N. S. 1367, that the contract in such cases is
so exclusively -with the first company, that the owner of the goods
can maintain no action against any of the subsequent companies
upon the line, even by showing that the loss or injury occurred
through their default. And the same rule is there applied to the
baggage of passengers ticketed over an extended line of travel, con-
sisting of different companies; the first company is alone respon-
sible to the owner, there being no priority between him and the
others: .3fytton v. Mlfidland Railway Company, 4 I. & N. 615.
17. But the rule of responsibility in all these cases is very
different in the American courts. We do not consider that there
is any such want of privity as to the subsequent companies,
that the owner of the goods or baggage may not maintain an action
against any of the subsequent carriers upon the line, by showirg
that the loss occurred there. It has been decided that the first
company, where there is a business connection through the route,
is liable for the whole route: Cary v. Cleveland and Toledo
Railway Company, 28 Barb. 35. And it has also been held,
where the different companies constitute a continuous line, and
run their cars over the whole route without change, selling
through tickets and checking baggage through, that an action for
loss of baggage, anywhere upon the route, will lie against either
company: Hart v. Rensselaer and Sar. Railway Oompany, 4
Selden 37.
18. We have already intimated that, in this country, the first
company upon a continuous line of transportation, where there is
no business connection between the different companies constitut-
ing the route, assumes no responsibility beyond its own line, except
for safe delivery to the next carrier upon the route: Redfield
on Railways, § 135, pl. 2, and numerous cases cited in note 6.
The first carrier -may, by special contract with the owner, assume
the entire responsibility of the safe delivery at the ultimate desti-
nation: Id. n. 7, and cases cited. And where there is a business
connection between the different companiies, extending through
the entire route, the first company will be regarded as having
assumed the responsibility of the entire route, unless there is
something in the contract or the circumstances indicating a differ.
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ent purpose: Redfield on Railways, § 135, and cases cited, pl. 4,
n. 8, 9.
19. The same rules of construction and of responsibility, so far
as we know, have in this country been applied to express companies.
They have generally been held responsible for safe transportation
to the end of their lines, and careful delivery to the next company
on the route, with proper directions to each successive carrier; and
it was also considered that the successive carriers were only re-
sponsible for transportation across their own line, and for safe
delivery to the next carrier, according to the usual and most direct
line of communication with the ultimate point of destination. Thus
where an express company at Detroit received a package addressed
to Neiw York city, which came into the hands of the defendants at
Suspension Bridge, who carried it to Albany, and there delivered
it to the Hudson River Railway, common carriers between that
city and New York, giving proper instructions to that company,
it was held that the defendants were thereby exonerated from
further responsibility: Hempstead v. New Yorc Central Rail-
way Company, 28 Barb. 485. Where special instructions, in
regard to the mode of delivery, are given by the consignor, they
must be followed, unless, as we have seen, they are modified by
the consignee, and in either case the carrier must follow the latest
instructions: lMlichigan v. N. & S. Indiana Railway Company,
20 Illinois Rep. 375. In the English courts it makes no differ-
ence as to inferring a contract with the first carrier for the entire
route, that it consists partly of steamboat transportation and
partly by land where there is no railway; in all cases a presump.
tive responsibility for the entire route attaches to the first carrier:
Vilby v. The West Cornwall Railway Company, 2 H. & N.
702.
20. We might extend this article to an almost indefinite length,
but we must now content ourselves with a brief allusion to some
few questions of special interest connected with this mode of
transportation, and an imperfect analysis of the more recent
decisions bearing upon these questions.
(1). One who employs a carrier to carry an article of such a
dangerous character as to require extraordinary care in its con-
veyance, must communicate the fact to the carrier; or he cannot
hold him responsible for any injury to such article, which is, to
any extent or in any manner, the result of his omission to make
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such communication, either to the carrier or his servants: Tarrant
v. Baines, 16 0. B. N. S. 553; 8 Jur. N. S. 863.
(2.) In the somewhat recent case of Ashmore v. The Pennsyl-
vania, soc., Railway Company, 4 Dutcher 180, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey decided that, although it was entirely com-
petent for a carrier to stipulate for exemption from his extreme
common law responsibility, he could not by such contract dis-
charge himself from responsibility for the consequences of his
own fault or negligence, or that of his servants. And it seems
always to have been held in Ohio, that common carriers cannot
relieve themselves of their first and legal responsibility by their
own acts, or by general notice brought home to the knowledge
of the owner of the goods, and not objected to by him: -Davidson
v. Graham, 2 Ohio State Rep. 131; Grahiam & Co. v. -Davis &
Co., 4 Id. 762. See also ScoTT, J., in Welsh v. Th7e Pittsburgh,
Fort Wayne, and Chicago Railroad Company, 10 Ohio 70,
citing Jones v. Troorhies, 10 Ohio R. 145. And it was held in a
very recent case in Massachusetts, Judson v. Th7e Western Rail-
road Company, 9 Allen, that a common carrier cannot by general
notice exonerate himself from his legal responsibility, or fix a
limit beyond which he shall not be held liable.
(3). As before intimated, the first carrier upon an extendel
route of transportation, to whom goods are delivered, addressed
to some remote point upon the route, acts as a mere forwarding
agent, as to those connected with the transportation beyond the
terminus of his own route, and, as such, is only bound to the
extent of oinary care and common diligence: Northern Bail-
road Co. v. Fitchburgh Railroad Co., 6 Allen 254. And if an
injury occurs, or any loss ensues, by reason of the first carrier,
to whom the owner's instructions were communicated, not fully,
or understandingly, carrying them through the route, as he should
have done, as if the goods are in consequence sent to the wrong
place, this will not exonerate the owner from responsibility for the
charges of transportation by the subsequent carriers, or affect the
validity of their lien for such charges, as they have themselves
earned or advanced to the other companies from the point of
original departure: Briggs v. Boston and Lowell Railroad Co.,
6 Allen 246. But common carriers can acquire no lien upon
goods transported for the national government, so as to justify
their detention: Dufolt v. Gorman, 1 Min. 301.
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(4). The general duty of carriers of goods is defined in a late
English case, Hales v. London and North Western Railway Co.,
4 B. & S. 66, to be, to carry according to the usual route pro-
fessed by them to the public, and to deliver within a reasonable
time. And in another late English case, Peck v. North Stafford-
shire Railway Company, 9 Jur. N. S. 914, it is held, that all the
parts of the statute regulating the traffic, must be taken together,
and that the conditions affecting the responsibility of carriers
must be, in the opinion of the court, both just and reasonable, and
be also embodied in a special contract in writing, signed by the
owner or sender of the goods: S. P. Aldridge v. Great Western
Railway Co., 15 0. B. N. S. 582. And some of the American
courts seem to insist, that safe delivery to the consignee is primd
facie the duty of all carriers ; and with the necessary exceptions,
that it be upon their professed route, and consistent with their
mode of doing their business, we see no ground to question the
binding obligations of that rule: Bartlett v. Steamboat Phila-
delphia, 32 Missouri Rep. 256.
(5). And, in regard to express companies, who are generally
supposed to undertake for personal delivery to the consignee of all
packages within the range of their own particular route, it has
been lately decided, that such company should deliver, at the
place of business of the consignee, as early as practicable after
arrival, and within the usual business hours: Marshall v. The
American Express Co., 7 Wis. Rep. 1.
(6). Express companies have, to a considerable extent, acted as
collectors of bills of exchange and notes, in some poions of the
country. And it becomes a very serious question, for them, as
well as the public, how far such business is likely to involve them
in responsibility, it being something quite beyond and aside of the
ordinary carrying business. In a late case in Indiana, it was
held, that where such company receives for collection, for com.
pensation, a till of exchange, drawn in one state and payable in
another, and delivers the same to a notary, for demand and pro-
test, on the day before it should regularly be made, and in conse-
quence the notary makes such demand one day before the matu-
rity of the bill, whereby the drawer and indorsers are released,
the acceptor being insolvent, the company will be liable to the
holder for the sum due upon the bill: American Express Co. v.
Haine, 21 Indiana Rep. 4.
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(7). It seems, that it will not relieve a railway company from
its responsibility as a common carrier, because the owner of the
goods furnishes his own car, in which property is transported,
and assumes the loading and unloading, and furnishes a brakesman
to accompany the car: .iallory v. Tioga Railroad Co., 39 Barb.
Rep. 488.
(8). As to the form of action against common carriers, it seems
to have been settled, from an early day, that a delivery to a wrong
person will amount to a conversion: -Duff v. Budd, 3 B. & Bing.
177 ; Sanquer v. London and South Western Railroad Co., 32
Eng. L. & Eq. 338 ; Claflin v. Boston and Lowell Railroad Co.,
7 Allen 341. And the carrier may maintain an action in his own
name, for injury done to property intrusted to him, and may even
recover the value of the property, which he will hold in trust for
the owner: Hlerrilc v. Brainard, 38 Barb. 574. But in an
action for non-delivery of the goods, the owner cannot recover for
an injury to the goods: Nudd v. Wells & Co., 11 Wis. Rep. 407.
(9). The courts have had considerable controversy in regard
to questions affecting the amount of damages recoverable of com-
mon carriers. The English courts adhere strenuously to their
former views, that all speculative damages are to be excluded:
Redfield on Railways, § 148, p. 320. Thus, where the plaintiff
had ordered goods, by express, for the purpose of manufacturing
them into articles for sale, from which he expected to derive con-
siderable profit, and the articles were not delivered until the
season for the business had passed, the plaintiff was held entitled to
recover the difference in the market value of the articles between
the time of expected and gctual delivery, but nothing for the loss
of profits: Wilson v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co.,
9 0. B. N. S. 632, 7 Jur. N. S. 862. The same rule is declared
in Simmons v. South Baftern Railway Co., 7 Jur. N. S. 489.
And where the goods are not delivered at all, the rule of damages
is the value at the time and place of delivery, and interest from
that time: Sprihg vs. .faskell, 4 Allen 112. A common carrier
may limit the extent of his responsibility by express contract, but
it is said in New York, not by mere notice: Nevins vs. Bay
State, &c., Co., 4 Bosw. 225.
(10). It has been decided that the carrier may require of the
consignee a receipt, showing the delivery of the goods in good
condition, and that the owner has a corresponding right to examine
